We design new differentially private algorithms for the Euclidean k-means problem, both in the centralized model and in the local model of differential privacy. In both models, our algorithms achieve significantly improved error guarantees than the previous state-of-the-art. In addition, in the local model, our algorithm significantly reduces the number of interaction rounds.
private k-means algorithms, both for the centralized model (where a trusted curator collects the sensitive information and analyzes it with differential privacy) and for the local model (where each respondent randomizes her answers to the data curator to protect her privacy). In both models, our algorithms offer significant improvements over the previous state-of-the-art.
Before describing our new results, we define our setting more precisely. Consider an input database S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ (R d ) n containing n points in R d , where every point x i ∈ S is the (sensitive) information of one individual. The goal is to identify a set of k centers C = {c 1 , . . . , c k } in R d approximately minimizing the following quantity, referred to as the cost of the centers
The privacy requirement is that the output of our algorithm (the set of centers) does not reveal information that is specific to any single individual. Formally,
Definition 1.1 ([20]).
A randomized algorithm A : X n → Y is (ε, δ) differentially private if for every two databases S, S ∈ X n that differ in one row, and every set T ⊆ Y , we have
Combining the utility and privacy requirements, we are seeking for a computationally efficient differentially private algorithm that identifies a set of k centers C such that w.h.p. cost S (C) ≤ γ · OPT S +η, where OPT S is the optimal cost. We want γ and η to be as small as possible, as a function of the number of input points n, the dimension d, the number of centers k, the failure probability β, and the privacy parameters ε, δ.
We remark that a direct consequence of the definition of differential privacy is that, unlike in the non-private literature, every private algorithm for this problem must have additive error η > 0. In fact, η must grow with Λ 2 , where Λ bounds the diameter of the space of input points. To see this, consider k + 1 locations p 1 , . . . , p k+1 at pairwise distances Λ, and consider the following two neighboring datasets. The first dataset S 1 contains n − k + 1 copies of p 1 , and (one copy of) p 2 , . . . , p k . The second dataset S 2 is obtained from S 1 by replacing p k with p k+1 . Since in both cases there are only k distinct input points, the optimal cost for each of these datasets is zero. On the other hand, By the constraint of differential privacy, the set of centers we compute essentially cannot be affected by this change. Therefore we expect that at least on one of these instances we will have error Ω(Λ 2 ). In what follows we will therefore assume that input points come from the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), and we assume that Λ = 1 in the introduction.
Traditionally, in the non-private literature, the goal is to minimize the multiplicative error γ, with the current state-of-the-art (non-private) algorithm achieving multiplicative error of γ = 6.357 (with no additive error) [2] . In contrast, in spite of the long line of works on private kmeans [14, 38, 22, 25, 37, 45, 41, 43, 24, 8, 39, 29] , all of the existing polynomial time private algorithms for the problem obtained only a super constant multiplicative error. We present the first polynomial time differentially private algorithm for the Euclidean k-means problem with constant multiplicative error, while essentially keeping the additive error the same as in previous state-ofthe-art results. See Table 1 for a comparison.
Locally private k-means
In the local model of differential privacy (LDP), there are n users and an untrusted server. Each user i is holding a private input item x i (a point in R d in our case), and the server's goal is to compute [24] DP O(k log n)Õ √ d · k 1.5 Balcan et al. (2017) [8] DP O(log 3 n)Õ d + k 2 Nissim and Stemmer (2018) [39] DP O(k)Õ d 0.51 · k 1.51 This work DP O(1)Õ k 1.01 · d 0.51 + k 1.5 Nissim and Stemmer (2018) [ Non-private 6.357 0 Table 1 : Algorithms for k-means in the d-dimensional Euclidean space. DP denotes the standard (centralized) model of differential privacy, and LDP denotes the local model of differential privacy. Here n is the number of input points, k is the number of desired centers, and d is the dimension. For simplicity, we assume that the input points come from the unit ball, and omit the dependency in ε, as well as logarithmic factors in k, n, d, β, δ, from the additive error.
some function of the inputs (approximate the k-means in our case). However, in this model, the users do not send their data as is to the server. Instead, every user randomizes her data locally, and sends a differentially private report to the server, who aggregates all the reports. Informally, the privacy requirement is that the input of user i has almost no effect on the distribution on the messages that user i sends to the server. This is the model used by Apple, Google, and Microsoft in practice to ensure that private data never reaches their servers in the clear. With increasing demand from the industry, the local model of differential privacy is now becoming more and more popular. Nevertheless, the only currently available k-means algorithm under LDP (with provable utility guarantees) is that of Nissim and Stemmer [39] , with O(k) multiplicative error. We present a new LDP algorithm for the k-means achieving constant multiplicative error. In addition, the protocol of [39] requires O(k log n) rounds of interaction between the server and the users, whereas our protocol uses only O(1) rounds. See Table 1 for a comparison.
Classical algorithms are far from being private
We highlight some of the challenges that arise when trying to construct private variants for existing (non-private) algorithms. Recall for example the classical (non-private) Lloyd's algorithm, where in every iteration the input points are grouped by their proximity to the current centers, and the points in every group are averaged to obtain the centers for the next round. One barrier for constructing a private analogue for this algorithm is that, with differential privacy, the privacy parameters deteriorate with number of (private) computations that we apply to the dataset. So, even if we were able to construct a private analogue for every single iteration, our approximation guarantees would not necessarily improve with every iteration. In more details, composition theorems for differential privacy [21] allow for applying O(n 2 ) private computations before exhausting the privacy budget completely. Lloyd's algorithm, however, might have a much larger number of iterations (exponential in n in worst case). Even the bounds on it smoothed complexity are much larger than n 2 (currently ≈ n 32 is known [5] ). In addition, classical techniques for reducing the number of iterations often involve computations which are highly sensitive to a change of a small number of input points. For example, recall that in k-means++ [6] the initial k centers (with which Lloyd's algorithm is typically initiated) are chosen from the data points themselves, an operation which cannot be applied as is when the data points are private.
These challenges are reflected in the recent work of Nock et al. [41] , who constructed a private variant for the k-means++ algorithm. While their private algorithm achieves a relatively low multiplicative error of O(log k), their additive error isÕ(n). In this work we are aiming for additive error at most polylogarithmic in n (note that having additive error of n is meaningless, since if points come from the unit ball then every choice of k centers have error at most O(n)).
On the evolution of private k-means algorithms
The starting point of our work is the observation that by combining ideas from three previous works [25, 8, 39] we can obtain a differentially private k-means algorithm (in the centralized model) with constant multiplicative error, but with a relatively large additive error which is polynomial in n (as we will see in Section 1.4). Most of our technical efforts (in the centralized model) are devoted to reducing the additive error while keeping the multiplicative error constant. We now describe the results of [25, 8, 39] .
Gupta et al. [25] constructed a private variant for the classical local search heuristic [7, 32] . In this local search heuristic for k-means, we start with an arbitrary choice of k centers, and then proceed in iterations, where in every iteration we replace one of our current centers with a new one, so as to reduce the k-means cost. Gupta et al. [25] constructed a private variant of the local search heuristic by instantiating the (generally inefficient) exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [35] in order to privately choose a replacement center in every step. While the algorithm of Gupta et al. [25] obtains superb approximation guarantees, its runtime is exponential in the representation length of domain elements. 2 In particular, the algorithm is not applicable to the Euclidean space.
Balcan et al. [8] suggested the following strategy in order to adopt the techniques of Gupta et al. [25] to the Euclidean space. First, identify (in a differentially private manner) a small set Y ⊆ R d of candidate centers such that Y contains a subset of k candidate centers with low k-means cost. Then, apply the techniques of Gupta et al. in order to choose k centers from Y . If |Y | = poly(n), then the resulting algorithm would be efficient. As the algorithm of Gupta et al. has very good approximation guarantees, the bottleneck for the approximation error in the algorithm of Balcan et al. is in the construction of Y . Namely, the overall error is dominated by the error of the best choice of k centers out of Y (compared to the cost of the best choice of k centers from R d ). Balcan et al. then constructed a differentially private algorithm for identifying a set of candidate centers Y based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform [31] . However, their construction gives a set of candidate centers such that the best choice of k centers from these candidates is only guaranteed to have a multiplicative error of O(log 3 n), leading to a private k-means algorithm with O(log 3 n) multiplicative error.
A different approach to obtain a good k-means clustering privately is via algorithms for the 1-cluster problem, where given a set on n input points in R d and a parameter t ≤ n, the goal is to identify a ball of the smallest radius that encloses at least t of the input points. It was shown by Feldman et al. [24] that the Euclidean k-means problem can be reduced to the 1-cluster problem, by iterating the 1-cluster algorithm multiple times to find several balls that cover most of the data points. Feldman et al. then applied their reduction to the private 1-cluster algorithm of [40] , and obtained a private k-means algorithm with multiplicative error (k log n). Following that work, Nissim and Stemmer [39] presented an improved algorithm for the 1-cluster problem which, when combined with the reduction of Feldman et al., gives a private k-means algorithm with multiplicative error O(k).
Our techniques
Let S ∈ (R d ) n be an input database and let u * 1 , . . . , u * k ∈ R d denote an optimal set of centers for S. We use S * j ⊆ S to denote the cluster induced by u * j , i.e.,
We observe that the techniques that Nissim and Stemmer [39] applied to the 1-cluster problem can be used to privately identify a set of candidate centers Y that "captures" every "big enough" cluster j. Informally, let j be such that |S * j | ≥ n a (for some constant a > 0). We will construct a set of candidate centers Y such that there is a candidate center y j ∈ Y that is "close enough" to the optimal center u * j , in the sense that the cost of y j w.r.t. S * j is at most a constant times bigger than the cost of u * j . That is, cost S *
By simply ignoring clusters of smaller sizes, this means that Y contains a subset D of k candidate centers such that
There are two reasons for the poly(n) additive error incurred here. First, this technique effectively ignores every cluster of size less than n a , and we pay n a additive error for every such cluster. Second, this technique only succeeds with polynomially small probability, and boosting the confidence using repetitions causes the privacy parameters to degrade.
We show that it is possible to boost the success probability of the above strategy without degrading the privacy parameters. To that end, we apply the repetitions to disjoint subsamples of the input points, and show that the subsampling process will not incur a poly(n) error. In order to "capture" smaller clusters, we apply the above strategy repeatedly, where in every iteration we exclude from the computation the closest input points to the set of centers that we have already identified. We show that this technique allows to "capture" much smaller clusters. By combining this with the techniques of Balcan et al. and Gupta et al. for privately choosing k centers out of Y , we get our new construction for k-means in the centralized model of differential privacy (see Table 1 ).
A construction for the local model
Recall that the algorithm of Gupta et al. (the private variant of the local search) applies the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [35] in order to privately choose a replacement center in every step. This use of the exponential mechanism is tailored to the centralized model, and it is not clear if the algorithm of Gupta et al. can be implemented in the local model. In addition, since the local search algorithm is iterative with a relatively large number of iterations (roughly k log n iterations), a local implementation of it, if exists, may have a large number of rounds of interaction between the users and the untrusted server.
To overcome these challenges, in our locally private algorithm for the k-means we first identify a set of candidate centers Y (in a similar way to the centralized construction). Afterwards, we estimate the weight of every candidate center, where the weight of a candidate center y is the number of input points x ∈ S s.t. y is the nearest candidate center to x. We show that the weighted set of candidate centers can be post-processed to obtain an approximation to the k-means of the input points. In order to estimate the weights we define a natural extension of the wellstudied heavy-hitters problem under LDP, which reduces our incurred error. This results in our new construction for k-means in the local model of differential privacy (see Table 1 ).
Private coresets
A coreset [1] of set of input points S is a small (weighted) set of points P that captures some geometric properties of S. Coresets can be used to speed up computations, since if the coreset P is much smaller than S, then optimization problems can be solved much faster by running algorithms on P instead of S. In the context of k-means, the geometric property that we want P to preserve is the k-means cost of every possible set of centers. That is, for every set of k centers D ⊆ R d we want that cost P (D) ≈ cost S (D) (where in cost P (D) we multiply each distance by the weight of the corresponding point). Coresets for k-means and k-medians have been the subject of many recent papers, such as [17, 23, 26, 27, 10, 18] . Private coresets for k-means and k-medians have been considered in [22] and in [24] . We show that our techniques result in new constructions for private coresets for k-means and k-medians, both for the centralized and for the local model of differential privacy. In the local model, this results in the first private coreset scheme with provable utility guarantees. In the centralized model, our new construction achieves significantly improved error rates over the previous state-of-the-art.
Preliminaries
In k-means clustering we aim to partition n points into k clusters in which each point x belongs to the cluster whose mean is closest to x. Formally, for a set of points S ∈ (R d ) n and a set of centers C ⊆ R d , the cost of C w.r.t. the points S is defined as
Definition 2.1 (k-means). Let S be a (weighted or unweighted) finite set of points in
For a set of points S ∈ (R d ) n we use OPT S to denote the cost of the k-means of S. That is,
Moreover, for a set of points S ∈ (R d ) n and a set of centers Y ⊆ R d we write OPT S (Y ) to denote the lowest possible cost of k centers from Y . That is,
Preliminaries from differential privacy
Consider a database where each entry contains information pertaining to one individual. An algorithm operating on databases is said to preserve differential privacy if a change of a single record of the database does not significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. Intuitively, this means that individual information is protected: whatever is learned about an individual could also be learned with her data arbitrarily modified (or without her data at all). [20] ). Two databases S, S ∈ X n are called neighboring if they differ in at most one entry. A randomized algorithm M : X n → Y is (ε, δ) differentially private if for every two neighboring datasets S, S ∈ X n and every T ⊆ Y we have
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy
where the probability is over the randomness of M .
The Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms
The most basic constructions of differentially private algorithms are via the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms as specified in the following theorems.
Theorem 2.5 (Laplace mechanism [20]). A random variable is distributed as Lap(b) if its probability density function is
Theorem 2.6 (Gaussian Mechanism [19] ). Let ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), and assume f :
Noisy average of vectors in R d
Consider the task of privately estimating the average of n vectors in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ). The Gaussian mechanism (Theorem 2.6) allows for privately estimating this average with additive
In some cases, we could relax the dependency on Λ using the following theorem. Theorem 2.7 ([40]). Let β, ε, δ > 0. There exists an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that takes a database S ∈ (R d ) n and a parameter r. The algorithm outputs a point y ∈ R d such that if diam(S) ≤ r then with probability at least (1 − β) it holds that
Importantly, differential privacy is guaranteed to hold even if diam(S) > r.
Let 0 < α < 1 be a parameter, and observe that if n √ d αε then the algorithm from the theorem above returns (w.h.p.) an estimation for the average of S with L 2 error at most αr.
Private k-means and candidate centers
In the discrete version of the k-means clustering problem, there is a fixed and finite subset Y ⊆ R d , which we call candidate centers. Given a set of points S ∈ (R d ) n our goal is to identify a subset C ⊆ Y of size k with the lowest possible cost. That is, instead of searching for k centers in R d , we are searching for k centers in Y , and our runtime is allowed to depend polynomially on |Y |. As was shown by Gupta et al. [25] and Balcan et al. [8] , it is possible to privately approximate this discrete version of the problem by constructing a differentially private variant of the local search algorithm [32] .
Theorem 2.8 ([25, 8])
. Let β, ε, δ > 0 and k ∈ N, and let Y ⊆ R d be a finite set centers. There exists an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that takes a database S containing n points from the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), and outputs a subset D ⊆ Y of size |D| = k s.t. with probability at least (1 − β) we have that
In [25, 8] the above theorem is stated slightly differently, for pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy. The variant stated in Theorem 2.8 results from the stronger composition properties of (ε, δ)-differential privacy (see [21] ).
Locality sensitive hashing
A locality sensitive hash function aims to maximize the probability of a collision for similar items, while minimizing the probability of collision for dissimilar items. Formally, Definition 2.9 ([30]). Let M be a metric space, and let r>0, c>1, 0≤q<p≤1. A family H of functions mapping M into domain U is an (r, cr, p, q) locality sensitive hashing family (LSH) if for all x, y ∈ M (i)
The Poisson approximation
When throwing n balls into R bins, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is Bin(n, 1/R). As the Poisson distribution is the limit distribution of the binomial distribution when n/R is fixed and n → ∞, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is approximately Pois(n/R). In fact, in some cases we may approximate the joint distribution of the number of balls in all the bins by assuming that the load in each bin is an independent Poisson random variable with mean n/R. Theorem 2.10 (e.g., [36] ). Suppose that n balls are thrown into R bins independently and uniformly at random, and let X i be the number of balls in the i th bin, where
In particular, the theorem states that any event that takes place with probability p in the Poisson case, takes place with probability at most pe √ n in the exact case (this follows by letting f be the indicator function of that event).
We will also use the following bounds on the tail probabilities of a Poisson random variable:
3 Private k-means -the centralized setting
In this section we present our construction for the centralized model. The main step in the construction is to identify a set of candidate centers that contains a subset of k centers with low k-means cost. Consider an input database S, and let u * 1 , . . . , u * k ∈ R d denote an optimal set of k centers for S. In Section 3.1 we use the techniques of Nissim and Stemmer [39] in order to identify a set of candidate centers that contains a "close enough" candidate center to every optimal center u * j , provided that the optimal cluster induced by u * j is "big enough". Smaller clusters will be handled in Section 3.2.
Reformulating the results of [39]
In this section we present a procedure, named LSH-Procedure, for privately identifying a set of centers with a small distance to some of the input points. Most of the ideas in the analysis of this procedure have appeared in the work of Nissim and Stemmer [39] who studied the related 1-Cluster problem. We modify their procedure to output a set of several candidate centers, and boost the success probability. We will later apply this procedure iteratively in our construction for approximating the k-means.
We use a family H of (r, cr, p=n −b , q=n −2−a )-locality sensitive hash functions, mapping R d to a universe U , for some constants 1 > a > b > 0, r > 0, and c > 1. Such families exist for every choice of constants 1 > a > b > 0 and r > 0, with c = c(a, b) (see, e.g., [4] ). Furthermore, w.l.o.g., we can assume that the range U of the functions in H is of size |U | ≤ n 3 . If this is not the case, then we Algorithm LSH-Procedure Input: Database S ∈ R d containing n points, number r > 0, failure probability β, privacy parameters ε, δ.
Tool used: Family H of (r, cr, p=n −b , q=n −2−a )-locality sensitive hash functions mapping R d to a universe U , for some parameters 0 < b < a < 1, and c = c(a, b) > 1.
as the multiset containing all elements of S m that are mapped into u by h m , i.e.,
3. Use the Laplace mechanism 3 with privacy parameter can simply apply a (pairwise independent) hash function with range n 3 to the output of the locally sensitive hash function. Clearly, this does not decrease the collision probability of "close" elements (within distance r), and moreover, this can increase the collision probability of "non-close" elements (at distance at least cr) by at most n −3 = o(n −2−a ) = o(q).
Lemma 3.1. Algorithm LSH-Procedure is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, there exists a constant Γ > 1 such that the following holds. Assume we apply LSH-Procedure to a database S ∈ (R d ) n with parameters r, β, ε, δ, a, b, and c. Let P ⊆ S be s.t. diam(P ) ≤ r and |P | = t for some t satisfying
The algorithm outputs a set of at most εn/ log n centers, s.t. with probability at least 1 − β a ball of radius (2c + 1)r around one of these centers contains all of P .
The proof is very similar to the that of [39] . We include the proof in the appendix for completeness.
Remark 3.2. We think of a and b as small constants, e.g., a = 0.2 and b = 0.1. Hence, ignoring logarithmic factors, the above theorem only requires t to be as big as n 0.3 √ d/ . Smaller constants a, b result in a bigger (but constant) approximation factor c = c(a, b).
Algorithm Private-Centers Input: Database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), failure probability β, privacy parameters ε, δ, and additional LSH parameters 0 < b < a < 1, and c = c(a, b) > 1 (as in Algorithm LSH-Procedure).
Run algorithm LSH-Procedure on the database S with parameters ε log n , δ log n , r, β, a, b, c, and add the returned set of centers to C.
Output C.
Recall that algorithm LSH-Procedure requires an input parameter r that bounds the diameter of a subset of t input points. The next construction removes the necessity of this input by executing the LSH-Procedure multiple times with exponentially growing choices for the parameter r.
Lemma 3. 3 . Algorithm Private-Centers is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, there exists a constant Γ > 1 such that the following holds. Assume we apply Private-Centers to a database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), with parameters β, ε, δ, a, b, c. Let P ⊆ S be s.t. |P | = t for some t satisfying
The algorithm outputs a set of at most εn centers, s.t. with probability at least 1 − β a ball of radius O(diam(P ) + Λ n ) around one of these centers contains all of P .
Proof. The privacy guarantees of the algorithm are immediate. As for the utility analysis, recall that in Step 2 the algorithm applies the LSH-Procedure with exponentially growing choices of r. Let i * be the smallest integer s.t. r * = 2 i * ·Λ n ≥ diam(P ). Clearly, r * ≤ 2·diam(P )+ Λ n . Now consider the application of LSH-Procedure in Step 2 of algorithm Private-Centers, in which r = r * . The statement now follows from Lemma 3.1.
Remark 3. 4 . Using standard techniques for confidence amplification (applying Private-Centers with a constant confidence parameter log(1/β) times), the requirement on t in Lemma 3.3 can be replaced with
at the expense of returning εn log(1/β) centers instead of εn centers. Furthermore, by slightly increasing the constant a, the requirement on t can be written as
Algorithm Private-k-Means Input: Database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), failure probability β, privacy parameters ε, δ, and additional LSH parameters 0 < b < a < 1, and c = c(a, b) > 1 (as in Algorithm Private-centers).
% Let u * 1 , . . . , u * k denote an optimal set of centers for S, and let S * j be the cluster induced by u * j , i.e.,
1. Initiate C = ∅, and denote S 1 = S and n 1 = n.
2. For i = 1 to log log n do (a) Run algorithm Private-Centers on the database S i with parameters ε log log n , δ log log n , β k , a, b, c, and add the returned set of centers to C.
points with the largest distance to the centers in C, where w = w(n, d, k, β, ε, δ) and T = T (n) will be specified in the analysis. 
Capturing smaller and smaller clusters
We are now ready to present our construction for the centralized model -algorithm Private-k-Means. The algorithm privately identifies a polynomial set of candidate centers such that there exists a subset of k candidate centers with low k-means cost. By the results of Gupta et al. [25] and Balcan et al. [8] , this suffices for privately approximating the k-means of the inputs (see Theorem 2.8).
For readability, we have added inline comments throughout the description of Private-k-Means, which will be helpful for the analysis. These comments are not part of the algorithm. Let u * 1 , . . . , u * k denote an optimal set of centers w.r.t. the set of input points S, and let S * 1 , . . . , S * k ⊆ S be the clusters induced by these optimal centers, i.e., S * j ⊆ S is the set of input points whose nearest optimal center is u * j . (These optimal centers and clusters are unknown to the algorithm; they are only used in the inline comments and in the analysis.) Throughout the execution, we use the inline comments in order to prescribe a feasible (but not necessarily optimal) assignment of the data points to (a subset of k of) the current candidate centers. Specifically, we maintain an array ASSIGN, where we write ASSIGN[j] = u (for some center u in our current set of candidate centers) to denote that all of the points in the optimal cluster S * j are assigned to the candidate center u. We write ASSIGN[j] = ⊥ to denote that points in S * j have not been assigned to a center yet. For every j we have that ASSIGN[j] = ⊥ at the beginning of the execution, and that ASSIGN[j] is changed exactly once during the execution, at which point the jth cluster is assigned to a center. In the analysis we argue that at the end of the execution the resulting assignment has low k-means cost.
S
The input database.
An optimal set of centers for S.
The set of remaining input points during the ith iteration. n i = |S i |, i ∈ [log log n] The number of remaining input points during the ith iteration.
C
The current set of candidate centers.
The assignment constructed in the inline comments. Notation. For a point x ∈ S, we write ASSIGN(x) to denote the candidate center to which x is assigned at a given moment of the execution. That is, ASSIGN(x) = ASSIGN[j], where j is s.t. x ∈ S * j .
Consider the execution of algorithm Private-k-Means. For readability, we have summarized some of the notations that are specified in the algorithm in Table 2 . In addition, we denote
where Γ is the constant from Remark 3. 4 . Consider the following good event:
Event E 1 (over the randomness of Private-Centers):
Step 2a of the ith iteration, the set C contains a center u j ∈ C s.t.
Claim 3. 5 . Event E 1 occurs with probability at least 1 − β.
Proof. By the properties of algorithm Private-Centers (Lemma 3.3), and a union bound over i ∈ [log log n] and j ∈ [k], Event E 1 happens with probability at least 1 − β.
The proof continues by showing that whenever event E 1 occurs, algorithm Private-k-Means successfully identifies a "good" set of candidate centers, in the sense that there is a subset of k candidate centers with low k-means cost w.r.t. the input S. We first show that if E 1 occurs then the number of unassigned points reduces quickly in every iteration. is assigned before Step 2b of the ith iteration, because if P * ⊆ S i then by Event E 1 cluster is assigned after Step 2a of the ith iteration, and if P * ⊆ S i then the assignment must have already occurred before the ith iteration. Recall that |P * | ≥ 1 2 |S * |, as otherwise less than half of the points in S * are within distance r * from u * , and so cost S * ({u * }) > |S * | 2 · (r * ) 2 = cost S * ({u * }). Hence, before Step 2b of the ith iteration, there could be at most 2kw · n a+b i unassigned points.
Notation. For i ∈ [log log n] we denote by A i ⊆ S and B i ⊆ S the subset of input points whose cluster is assigned to a center during the ith iteration in the comments after Step 2a and after
Step 2b, respectively. Observe that A 1 , B 1 , . . . , A log log n , B log log n are mutually disjoint.
Notation.
Recall the optimal centers u * 1 , . . . , u * k and the radiuses r * 1 , . . . , r * k defined in the first comment in algorithm Private-k-Means. For a point x ∈ R d , let u * (x) denote x's nearest optimal center, and r * (x) its corresponding radius.
Observation 3. 7 . For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ A i , at the end of the execution we have
Lemma 3.8. If Event E 1 occurs, then for every iteration i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ B i there exists a set of input points Q(x) ⊆ S such that 1. For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ B i it holds that |Q(x)| = T , where T = O(log log n).
2.
For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x, y ∈ B i , if x = y then Q(x) ∩ Q(y) = ∅.
3.
For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ B i , at the end of the execution it holds that
Proof. Let us focus on the ith iteration. By Claim 3.6, before
Step 2b, there could be at most 2k · w · n a+b i unassigned points in S. In particular, |B i | ≤ 2k · w · n a+b i
. As |S i+1 | = n i+1 = 2(T + 1)wk · n a+b i , we have that S i+1 contains at least 2T wk · n a+b i assigned points (which were already assigned before the ith iteration). For x ∈ B i we define Q(x) to be an arbitrary set of T assigned points from S i+1 , such that for all x = y ∈ B i it holds that Q(x) ∩ Q(y) = ∅. It remains to prove item 3 of the lemma.
Notation.
We write Q i to denote the union of all sets Q(x) defined during the ith iteration. That is, Q i = x∈B i Q(x).
Let j be a cluster that is assigned to a center during the ith iteration in the comment following
Step 2b (so S * j ⊆ B i ). As in the comment, let p j ∈ P * j \ S i+1 , and u j = argmin u∈C p j − u , where C is the set of candidate centers at that time. Recall that we set ASSIGN[j] = u j , and observe that since p j / ∈ S i+1 , for every q ∈ Q i ⊆ S i+1 , we have that p j − u j 2 ≤ min c∈C q − c 2 . In particular, since every q ∈ Q i was already assigned to a center before the ith iteration, we have that ASSIGN(q) ∈ C, and hence p j − u j 2 ≤ q − ASSIGN(q) 2 .
Now let x ∈ S * j . We get that
Lemma 3. 9 . Algorithm Private-k-Means is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, if the algorithm is applied to a database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), then it outputs a set of at most εn log( k β ) centers, s.t. with probability at least 1 − β
where w is defined in Equation (1), and T = Θ(log log n).
Proof. We show that the stated bound holds for the assignment described in the inline comments throughout the algorithm (the array ASSIGN) at the end of the execution. First observe that by Claim 3.6 and by the fact that there are log log n iterations, at the end of the execution there could be at most O (2(T + 1)wk)
unassigned input points. Let us denote the set of unassigned points as H. The distance from each unassigned point to an arbitrary center is trivially at most Λ. For every assigned point x, by Observation 3.7 and by Lemma 3.8, either
Hence,
Now recall that for every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x = y ∈ B i it holds that Q(x) ∩ Q(y) = ∅. Hence, every point q ∈ S contributes at most log log n times to the last summation above. So,
For T = Θ(log log n) (large enough) we get that the last term above is at most half of the left hand side of the inequality, and hence,
Combining Lemma 3.9 with Theorem 2.8 yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3. 10 . There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that, given a database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), identifies with probability 1−β a (γ, η)-approximation for the k-means of S, where γ = O(1) and η = poly log(n), log(
Private k-means -the distributed setting
We begin by describing private computation in the local model where each individual holds her private information locally, and only releases the outcomes of privacy-preserving computations on her data. This is modeled by letting the algorithm access each entry x i in the input database S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n separately, and only via differentially private local randomizers.
Definition 4.1 (Local Randomizer, LR Oracle [20, 33]).
A local randomizer R : X → W is a randomized algorithm that takes a database of size n = 1. Let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n be a database. An LR oracle LR S (i, R) gets an index i ∈ [n] and a local randomizer R, and outputs a random value w ∈ W chosen according to the distribution R(x i ). 
Local algorithms that prepare all their queries to LR S before receiving any answers are noninteractive; otherwise, they are interactive. When δ = 0 we omit it, and say that the algorithm satisfies ε-LDP.
Additional preliminaries
We now present additional preliminaries that enable our construction.
Counting queries and histograms with local differential privacy
The most basic task that we can apply in the local differential privacy model is counting. Let S ∈ {0, 1} n be a database which is distributed among n users (each holding one bit), and consider the task of estimating the number of users holding a 1. This can be solved privately with error proportional to 1 ε √ n (see, e.g., [33] ). A more general setting is when instead of a binary domain, every user holds an input item from some (potentially) large domain X. This can be solved using tools from the recent line of work on heavy hitters in the local model. [28, 12, 11, 15] Notation. For a database S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n and a domain element x ∈ X, we use f S (x) to denote the multiplicity of x in S, i.e., f S (x) = |{x i ∈ S : x i = x}|.
Theorem 4.3 ([28, 12, 11, 15] ). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive ε-LDP algorithm that operates on a (distributed) database S ∈ Y n for some finite set Y , and returns a mappinĝ f : Y → R such that the following holds. For every choice of y ∈ Y , with probability at least 1 − β, we have that
For our construction, we will need the following extension of Theorem 4.3. This extension is obtained from the analysis of [11] with minor modifications. We include the proof in the appendix for completeness. , with probability at least 1 − β, we have that
Algorithm LDP-GoodCenter
Let a > b > 0 and c > 1 be s.t. for every r > 0 there exists family H (r, cr, p=n −b , q=n −2−a )-sensitive hash functions mapping R d to a universe U . The next theorem follows from the results of Nissim and Stemmer [39] with minor modifications, where the constants a, b, c in the theorem depend on the LSH family that the algorithm is instantiated with.
Theorem 4.5 (Algorithm LDP-GoodCenter [39]).
There exists an ε-LDP algorithm that uses a constant number of interactions with the users, such that the following holds. Let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a database containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), and let P ⊆ S be a fixed subset (unknown to the algorithm) such that for a global constant Γ
The algorithm outputs a set Y of O ε · n 1/3+a / log 1/3 (n/β) vectors in R d s.t. with probability at least 1 − β there exists a vector y ∈ Y such that the ball of radius 5c · diam(P ) + Λ n around y contains all of P .
An LDP protocol for k-means
Algorithm LDP-k-Means Input: Failure probability β, privacy parameter ε, and additional LSH parameters 0 < b < a < 1 and c = c(a, b) > 1.
1. Apply algorithm LDP-GoodCenter (Theorem 4.5) on the database S with the privacy parameter to obtain for every y ∈ Y an estimationĉ y for c y .
% In more details, first every user i (holding an input xi ∈ R d ) identifies the center yi ∈ Y with minimal distance to xi. This defines a modified (distributed) database S = (y1, . . . , yn). Then, algorithm GroupHist is applied to this modified database, and returns a mappingf : Y → R. The weightsĉy are computed aŝ cy =f (y). In the analysis we will use the additional properties of GroupHist. 4 . LetB = {(y,ĉ y ) : y ∈ Y }.
5
. LetĈ be a (non-private) approximation to the k-means ofB. 6 . ReturnĈ.
Similarly to our construction for the centralized model, we will design an algorithm for approximating the k-means by first identifying a set of candidate centers, and then choosing a subset of k of them with low k-means cost. However, the techniques of Gupta et al. and Balcan et al.
(for choosing the subset of k candidate centers) do not directly apply to the local model. Instead, after obtaining the set of candidate centers Y , we privately assign (noisy) weights to the candidate centers, where the weight of y ∈ Y is the number of input points whose nearest candidate center is Y . We then show that this information (the set of candidate centers with their weights) can be post-processed to obtain an approximation to the k-means of the input points.
Consider the execution of algorithm LDP-k-Means, and consider the notations specified in Table 3 . 
Proof. For a point x and a set of centers C, let C(x) be the center in C which is closest to x. So,
S
Y
The set of L centers chosen on Step 1. B = {(y, c y )} y∈Y The weighted set of points defined on Step 2. B = {(y,ĉ y )} y∈Y The weighted set of points defined on Step 4.
A subset of k centers from Y that minimizes costB(·). 
Theorem 4.8. Algorithm LDP-k-Means satisfies ε-LDP and uses a constant number of interactions with the users. In addition, with probability at least 1 − β the algorithms returns a (γ, η)-approximation for the k-means of the (distributed) data points, where γ = O(1) and η = O
Proof. The privacy properties of algorithm LDP-k-Means are immediate (follows from composition). We now proceed with the utility analysis. Consider the following event:
Event E 1 (over the randomness of algorithm LDP-GoodCenter):
denote an optimal set of centers for S, and let S * j be the cluster induced by u * j , i.e., S * j = {x ∈ S :
, and let
By the properties of algorithm LDP-GoodCenter (Theorem 4.5), with probability at least 1 − β k , there exists a center y (j) ∈ Y s.t. a ball of radius O(r * j + Λ n ) around y (j) contains all of P * j . Using the union bound, this is the case for every such j simultaneously with probability at least 1 − β. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Now, for every j s.t. |P * j | < t, let y (j) be an arbitrary center in Y , and denote D = {y (1) , . . . , y (k) } ⊆ Y . We establish an upper bound on the cost of D (w.r.t. the input points S) by prescribing a feasible (but not necessarily optimal) assignment of the data points to the centers in D: Every point x ∈ S is assigned to the center y (j) , where j is such that x ∈ S * j . We have that
In particular, Event E 1 happens with probability at least 1 − β.
Event E 2 (over the randomness of algorithm GroupHist): 
Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every j ∈ [k] and every subset D ⊆ Y of size k with probability at least 1 − β. We now show that Event E 2 occurs in this case. Indeed, for every such D ⊆ Y we have
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (and by recalling that j |G D j | = |Y |). The analysis for the reverse direction is identical. This shows that Event E 2 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
We are now ready to complete the proof. On
Step 5 of algorithm LDP-k-Means we identify a non-private approximationĈ for the k-means ofB. 4 Together with Event E 2 (stating that cost B (D) ≈ costB(D) for every subset D ⊆ Y of size k) we get that
Our goal is to bound cost S Ĉ . By Claim 4.7,
where the last inequality is because Y * S ⊆ Y , and Y * B minimizes cost B (·) over every subset of Y of size k. Now, by Claim 4.6 we have that
Finally, by Event E 1 , and be recalling that |Y | = O ε · n 1/3+a / log 1/3 (n/β) , we have
Private coresets for k-means
Let S be a set of input points. A coreset of S is a small (weighted) set of points P that captures some geometric properties of S. In the context of k-means, the geometric property that we want P to capture is the k-means cost of every possible choice for k centers. That is, for every set of k centers D ⊆ R d we want that cost P (D) ≈ cost S (D). Formally, Definition 5.1 (Coreset for k-means). Let S be a finite set of points in R d . A finite set of weighted points
We are interested in private algorithms for computing coresets. That is, we are seeking for a differentially private algorithm A that takes a database S ∈ (R d ) n and outputs a (weighted) set P such that 1. The privacy of the input points in S is preserved; and, 2. The output P allows for approximating the k-means cost of every choice for k centers (w.r.t.
the input set S).
In this section we briefly describe how our techniques from the previous sections can be used to obtain differentially private algorithms for coresets, both for the centralized model and for the local model of differential privacy.
Consider again Algorithm LDP-k-Means. Given an input set S, we privately identified a set Y of candidate centers, and privately estimated the weights of every center y ∈ Y , where the weight of a candidate center y is the number of input points that y is their closest neighbor in Y . We denoted the resulting assignment of (noisy) weights to the candidate centers asB, and used B to denote these points with their "true" weights. In the analysis, we then argued that for every set of
With the coreset objective in mind, the above equation suggests that our (privately computed) B might actually be a coreset of S. However, Definition 5.1 requires our approximation guarantees to hold for every choice of k centers from R d , whereas Equation (5) only holds for every choice of k centers out of Y (our precomputed set of candidate centers). Actually, the approximation cost S (D) ≈ cost B (D) does hold for every D ⊆ R d (see Claims 4.6 and 4.7), and it is only the connection between cost B (D) and costB(D) that requires attention. Specifically, in the analysis of Event E 2 , we first showed that for every fixed set of centers D we have that cost B (D) ≈ costB(D), and then we used the union bound over every possible choice for k centers out of Y . As |Y | = poly(n), this increased our error by a factor of at most log(n k ), which was acceptable. However, this argument fails if the centers in D come from an infinite domain.
To recover from this difficulty and get a coreset after all, we add a step to the algorithm in which we we take the setĈ of k-centers that approximates the optimal k-means (computed in Step 5), and recompute approximate weightsĉ z for every z ∈Ĉ. That is, we rerun Step 3 of Algorithm LDP-k-Means withĈ as the set Y and return the (weighted) setĈ as our coreset.
Every possible choice D of k centers in R d induce a partition ofĈ in which each part consists of the centers inĈ that are closest to a particular element of D. So it suffices to apply the union bound to every possible partitioning ofĈ into k groups and argue that the weighted cost of such a partition (with respect to any set of centers D that induce it) is close to the cost of the entire data set with respect to D. We obtain the following theorems:
There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that, given a database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), identifies with probability 1 − β a (γ, η)-coreset of S, where γ = O(1) and η = poly log(n), log(
Theorem 5. 3 . There is an ε-LDP algorithm that uses a constant number of interactions with the users. In addition, with probability at least 1 − β the algorithms returns a (γ, η)-coreset for the (distributed) data points, where γ = O(1) and η = poly log(
Fix again m ∈ [M ]. By the properties of the family H, for every x, y ∈ R d s.t. x − y ≥ cr we have that Pr hm∈H [h m (x) = h m (y)] ≤ q = n −2−a . Using the union bound we get
Let x be an arbitrary point in P ∩ S m . By linearity of expectation, we have that
Hence, by Markov's inequality,
So,
Simplifying, for large enough n (specifically, for n a−b ≥ 2) we get
As Event E 1 has occurred, we get
We have established that with probability at least n −a /2 over the choice of h m ∈ H in Step 2 the following events occur: (E 2 ) For every x, y ∈ S m s.t. x − y ≥ cr it holds that h m (x) = h m (y); and,
4M points from P ∩ S m are mapped into the same value by h m . Now recall that on Step 2 we choose M independent hash functions (h 1 , . . . , h M ). Hence, for M ≥ 2n a ln( 1 β ), with probability at least 1 − β there exists m * ∈ [M ] for which events E 2 , E 3 occur. In such a case, we get that by E 3 there is a hash value u * s.t.
and furthermore, by E 2 , for every x, y ∈ S m s.t. h m * (x) = h m * (y) = u * we have that x − y ≤ cr.
We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. In
Step 3 we use the Laplace mechanism to obtain estimationsŵ m,u ≈ |S m,u | for every (m, u) ∈ [M ] × U , and to construct a list L ⊆ [M ] × U that contains all pairs (m, u) with large estimations. Recall that, w.l.o.g., we have that |U | ≤ n 3 . Hence, by the properties of the Laplace mechanism (Theorem 2.5), with probability at least 1−β, all of our estimations are accurate to within Denote the average of the points in S m * ,u * as y * , and observe that by E 2 , a ball of radius cr around y * contains all of S m * ,u * . In Step 4 we use the algorithm from Theorem 2.7 to compute the noisy averageŷ m * ,u * of S m * ,u * . The noise magnitude reduces with the size of the set |S m * ,u * |
δ , with probability at least (1 − β) we have that y * −ŷ m * ,u * ≤ cr. In such a case we have that a ball of radius 2cr around y m * ,u * contains all of S m * ,u * , and in particular, contains some of the points from P . Hence, as P is of diameter r, we get that a ball of radius (2c + 1)r aroundŷ m * ,u * contains all of P .
All in all, with probability at least 1 − 4β we have that the output on Step 5 is a set of centers {ŷ m,u : u ∈ L} such that a ball of radius (2c + 1)r around one of these centers contains all of P .
B Algorithm GroupHist
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 4. 4 . The analysis is almost identical to the analysis of [11] . We include the details here for completeness. We first restate Theorem 4.4.
Theorem B.1 (Algorithm GroupHist). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive ε-LDP algorithm that operates on a (distributed) database S ∈ Y n for a finite set Y and returns a mappinĝ f : Y → R such that the following holds. For every choice of a subset Q ⊆ Y with weights σ : Q → [0, 1], with probability at least 1 − β, we have that
The protocol, GroupHist, uses the following simple local randomizer R.
Algorithm R: Basic Randomizer Inputs: x ∈ {±1}, and privacy parameter ε. That is, y∈Q σ(y) ·f (y) can be expressed as the sum of |Q| · n independent random variables with expectation y∈Q σ(y) · f S (y). The theorem now follows from the Hoeffding bound.
Remark B.2. For the analysis above it suffices that the entries Z are only k-wise independent, for k = O log( C Non-private approximation for k-means clustering [32, 25, 8] In Section 4 we used a non-private algorithm for approximating the k-means of a weighted set of pointsB, with possibly negative weights. We are not aware of a result for directly approximating the k-means of a set of points with negative weights. However, in our case the setB is not arbitrary, in the sense thatB is "close" to a set of points B with non-negative weights. This fact can be leveraged to obtain an approximation to the k-means ofB, e.g., by modifying the algorithm of [32] using the techniques of [25, 8] . We include their analysis here for completeness. We remark that the presentation here does not attempt to optimize constants, and refer the reader to [32, 25, 8] for a more detailed account. Note that each optimal center is captured by exactly one heuristic center, but each heuristic center may capture any number of optimal centers. We say that a heuristic center is lonely if it captures no optimal center. The analysis is based on constructing a set of swap pairs.
We begin by defining a simultaneous partition of the heuristic centers and the optimal centers into two sets of groups D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D r and Y * 1 , Y * 2 , . . . , Y * r for some r, such that |D i | = |Y * i | for all i. For each heuristic center d that captures some number m ≥ 1 of optimal centers, we form a group of m optimal centers consisting if these captured centers. The corresponding group of heuristic centers consists of d together with any m − 1 lonely heuristic centers. (See [32] for an illustration and for more details. ) We generate the swap pairs as follows. For every partition that involves one captured center we generate a swap pair consisting of the heuristic center and its captured center. For every partition containing two or more captured centers we generate swap pairs between the lonely heuristic centers and the optimal centers, so that each optimal center is involved in exactly one swap pair and each lonely heuristic center is involved in at most two swap pairs. It is easy to verify that:
(1) each optimal center is swapped in exactly once, (2) each heuristic center is swapped out at most twice, and Notations. For a set of points S, a set of centers Z, and a center z ∈ Z, we write N S (z, Z) to denote the set of points from S that are closer to z than to any other center in Z. For a set of points S, a set of centers Z, and a point x ∈ S, we write Z(x) to denote the nearest neighbor of x in Z.
For each swap pair d, o we establish an upper bound on the difference cost S (D \ {d} ∪ {o}) − cost S (D) by prescribing a feasible (but not necessarily optimal) assignment of the data points to the centers D \ {d} ∪ {o}. First, the data points in N S (o, Y * ) are assigned to o, implying a change of
Each point x ∈ N S (d, D) \ N S (o, Y * ) has lost d as a center and must be reassigned to a new center. Since x is not in N S (o, Y * ) we know that Y * (x) = o, and hence by property (3) above d does not capture Y * (x). Therefore D(Y * (x)), the nearest heuristic center to Y * (x), exists after the swap.
We assign x to D(Y * (x)). Thus the change due to this reassignment is at most
So, by (6) and (7) we have that
We now want to sum Inequality 8 over over all swap pairs. To that end, recall that each optimal center is swapped in exactly once, and hence each point x contributes once to the first sum. Also note that the quantity in the second sum is always non-negative, because D(Y * (x)) ∈ D and d is the closest center in D to x. Hence, by extending the sum to all x ∈ N S (d, D) we can only increase its value. Recalling that each heuristic center is swapped in at most twice we have
